Cyber Response Assumptions Part IV - Data Flow is Critical

 In the aftermath of a significant national cyber security incident, the ensuing coordination effort is likely to be a significant challenge. It's likely to be a challenge for a number of reasons - not the least of which was one of the assumptions outlined earlier:

• Assumption #3 - The scope of the event may not be limited to a specific region like 9/11 or Katrina. Cyberspace doesn't follow traditional regional boundaries.

The issues likely to present themselves during the response will not be region specific. They are likely to be widespread, requiring coordination across large areas of the country (or internationally). Because of this, the very nature of the command and control infrastructure used to coordinate responses in events like Katrina, the September 11 attacks, or other localized events simply doesn't scale. 
This command and control response will look much more like an operations center in the military setting rather than a civilian response command center. Intelligence will be flowing in (hopefully) from a range of locations. Decisions will be made at the command center and distributed to all of the key personnel across the affected regions. 
Of course, one of the major potential issues is that the very command and control infrastructure required to coordinate the response across the wide region affected by the event may be (actually, is likely to be) impacted by the event itself. Telecommunication systems, cellular telephone access, Internet access, even traditional 'out of band' communications devices and services (Ham radios, satellite radios, etc.) could be impacted and rendered ineffective or inoperable by the event itself.
This is not an easy problem to solve, but it has been addressed quite thoroughly by the military services. Hopefully the Department of Defense can advise the Department of Homeland Security, given their decades of command and control experience.